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Abstract
We study fairness in economies with one private good and one par-
tially excludable nonrival good. A social ordering function determines
for each proﬁle of preferences an ordering of all conceivable alloca-
tions. We propose the following Free Lunch Aversion condition: if the
private good contributions of two agents consuming the same quantity
of the nonrival good have opposite signs, reducing that gap improves
social welfare. This condition, combined with the more standard re-
quirements of Unanimous Indiﬀerence and Responsiveness, delivers a
form of welfare egalitarianism in which an agent’s welfare at an alloca-
tion is measured by the quantity of the nonrival good that, consumed
at no cost, would leave her indiﬀerent to the bundle she is assigned.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
We consider an environment where a private good can be used to produce
a nonrival good. We assume that diﬀerent agents may consume diﬀerent
quantities of the nonrival good: “partial exclusion” is possible. Examples of
such goods include cable television programs and noncongested parks, roads,
libraries, or sport facilities. The agents are endowed with (large) amounts
of the private good, and they own the production technology in common.
The problem we face is to choose how much nonrival good to produce, how
much of it each agent is allowed to consume, and how much private good
each agent is asked to contribute. We are interested in eﬃciency as well as
equity.
The standard approach to this problem is to look for allocation rules. An
allocation rule speciﬁes which feasible allocations are the most desirable as a
function of the parameters of the problem, namely, the production technology
and the agents’ preferences over bundles of private and nonrival goods. Con-
tributions to that literature include Foley (1967), Mas-Colell (1980), Moulin
(1987), Sprumont (1998). Quite naturally, all these papers impose Pareto
eﬃciency. This immediately rules out exclusion: all agents should consume
the entire production of the nonrival good.
An alternative approach is to look for social ordering functions. A (social
ordering) function speciﬁes a complete ranking of all conceivable allocations,
feasible or not, as a function of the parameters of the problem. This paper
deals with such social ordering functions. We are motivated by second-best
considerations. In many circumstances, it is not suﬃcient to know which
technologically feasible allocations are the most desirable. For instance, if an
allocation has already been chosen and is viewed by all as a legitimate status
quo, any recommended allocation should dominate this status quo (and, in
addition, might have to stay suﬃciently close to it). In the same vein, if the
nonrival good production and consumption levels have been ﬁxed and only
individual contributions remain to be chosen, the most desirable allocation
need again not be achievable. Lastly, but most importantly, achievable al-
locations may be restricted by incentive-compatibility constraints. In fact,
the presence of such constraints is a primary motivation for considering al-
locations where agents are partially excluded from the consumption of the
nonrival good: as Moulin (1994) demonstrates, allowing partial exclusion
helps alleviate the free-rider problem.
To sum up, we believe that the set of achievable allocations is often veryuncertain and may have almost any shape. It is therefore very useful, and
perhaps even necessary, to determine a full ordering of the conceivable allo-
cations so as to be able to make a best choice from virtually any set.
We start from three simple principles for ordering allocations. First,
Unanimous Indiﬀerence: allocations that leave all agents indiﬀerent should be
equivalent. Second, Responsiveness: a social preference for an allocation over
another should be preserved when all agents’ upper contour sets at the better
allocation shrink and their upper contour sets at the worse allocation expand.
Third, Free Lunch Aversion: if two agents consume the same quantity of the
nonrival good, but one contributes positively to its production whereas the
other contributes negatively –thereby enjoying a “free lunch”–, a transfer
of private good from the latter to the former agent should be regarded as a
social improvement, provided that such a transfer does not reverse the signs
of the agents’ contributions.
We show that these three principles lead to a speciﬁc class of egalitarian,
or maximin, social ordering functions: at all proﬁles, allocations must be
ranked according to the welfare of the worst-oﬀ agent measured in terms of
the nonrival good. The nonrival good measure of an agent’s welfare at a given
allocation is deﬁned as the quantity of the nonrival good whose consump-
tion for free would leave her indiﬀerent to her actual bundle. A prominent
social ordering function satisfying our three principles is the nonrival-welfare
leximin function.
2S e t u p
One nonrival good may be produced from one private good. There is a
ﬁxed ﬁnite set of agents, N = {1,...,n}, with n ≥ 2. We denote by zi =
(xi,y i) ∈ R × R+ agent i’s consumption bundle. Here xi is the quantity of
the private good that agent i contributes to the production process: a positive
value means that i consumes less than her endowment in the private good,
which is left unspeciﬁed. By yi we denote the quantity of the nonrival good
that agent i consumes. This formulation allows diﬀerent agents to consume
diﬀerent quantities of the nonrival good: exclusion, complete or partial, is
possible. At the same time, we allow for negative private good contributions:
they might be useful to compensate for exclusion.
A preference for agent i is a binary relation Ri over R × R+ which is
complete, transitive, continuous, strictly decreasing in the private good con-
2tribution level xi, strictly increasing in the nonrival good consumption level
yi,a n dc o n v e x . I fzi ∈ R × R+,B (Ri,z i)={z0
i ∈ R × R+ | z0
iRizi} is the
upper contour set of Ri at zi. The indiﬀerence and strict preference relations
corresponding to Ri are denoted by Ii and Pi. The set of all preferences is
denoted by R.A( preference) proﬁle is a list R ∈ RN.
An allocation is a vector z =( z1,...,zn) ∈ (R×R+)N. It is admissible for
R if there exists a production level y such that, for each i ∈ N,
(0,y)RiziRi(0,0). (1)
Thus, no agent prefers her bundle to the opportunity of consuming any quan-
tity of the nonrival good for free, and everyone receives a non-negative share
of the surplus generated by the production of the nonrival good. We let
Zi(Ri)s t a n df o rt h es e to fb u n d l e szi satisfying (1) and we denote the set of
admissible allocations for R by Z(R). If i,j ∈ N are two distinct agents, z−i
denotes the restriction of the allocation z to N\{i} and z−ij is the restriction
of z to N\{i,j}.
A social ordering for R is a complete and transitive binary relation de-
ﬁned over Z(R), the set of all admissible allocations for R. A social ordering
function R assigns to each preference proﬁle R ∈ RN a social ordering R(R)
for R.T h u s , zR(R)z0 means that the allocation z is at least as desirable
as z0 from a social viewpoint if the preference proﬁle is R. Similarly, we use
I(R)a n dP(R)t od e n o t es o c i a li n d i ﬀerence and strict social preference.
One feature of our setup calls for a word of explanation. In contrast to the
literature on allocation rules, we make no assumption regarding technology.
In fact, the production function relating the nonrival good to the private
good contributions is left unspeciﬁed. The reason is that we are interested in
deﬁning social objectives rather than recommending choices directly. Since
the social orderings that we discuss do not depend on the technology, there is
no need to incorporate the latter in the model. Of course, the social choices
implicitly recommended by a social ordering R(R) result from constrained
maximization. Thus, if c(y) were the cost of producing a quantity y of the
nonrival good, the recommended allocations would be those that maximize
R(R) subject to the inequality
P
i∈N xi ≥ c(maxi∈N yi). We brieﬂyr e t u r nt o
this issue in the concluding section.
33A x i o m s
The rather uncontroversial idea that social preferences should agree with
individual preferences whenever the latter happen to be unanimous admits
several formulations. We consider the following three versions.
Unanimous Indiﬀerence. Let R ∈ RN and z,z0 ∈ Z(R). If ziIiz0
i for
all i ∈ N, then zI(R)z0.
Unanimity. Let R ∈ RN and z,z0 ∈ Z(R). If ziRiz0
i for all i ∈ N, then
zR(R)z0. If ziPiz0
i for all i ∈ N, then zP(R)z0.
Strong Pareto Principle. Let R ∈ RN and z,z0 ∈ Z(R). If ziRiz0
i for
all i ∈ N,t h e nzR(R)z0. If ziRiz0
i for all i ∈ N and ziPiz0
i for some i ∈ N,
then zP(R)z0.
The Strong Pareto Principle implies Unanimity, which in turns implies
Unanimous Indiﬀerence; the converse implications do not hold. In what
follows, we will only impose Unanimous Indiﬀerence. Combined with the two
axioms deﬁned below, Unanimous Indiﬀerence turns out to imply Unanimity.
Our next axiom, Responsiveness, is an inter-proﬁle property requiring a
form of robustness of the social ranking when individual preferences change.
If an allocation z is socially preferred to an allocation z0, that social prefer-
ence should be preserved when z “moves upwards” in all agents’ preferences
whereas z0 “moves downwards”. Upwards and downwards moves are evalu-
ated by looking at upper contour sets. Thus, Responsiveness requires that
the social preference for z over z0 be preserved when all agents’ upper con-
tour sets at (the bundle they are assigned at) z shrink whereas their upper
contour sets at z0 expand. Our axiom imposes this robustness on both the
weak and the strict social preference relations.
Responsiveness. Let R,R0 ∈ RN and z,z0 ∈ Z(R) ∩ Z(R0). Suppose
that for all i ∈ N, B(R0




{zR(R)z0} ⇒ {zR(R0)z0} and {zP(R)z0} ⇒ {zP(R0)z0}.
This property, which we borrow from Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1996),
is reminiscent of several inter-proﬁle robustness axioms that played a ma-
jor role in social choice and implementation theory, such as Maskin’s (1998)
monotonicity. We refer to Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1996) and Le Breton
and Weymark (2001) for a discussion of such properties. Responsiveness is
appealing from an ethical point of view because it guarantees that unam-
biguous changes in individual preferences are reﬂected in the social ordering
4of allocations. As many other robustness axioms, it may also be defended
on grounds of informational simplicity. Note in particular that once a strict
social preference has been established between two allocations, it cannot be
reversed by changes in preferences that leave the individual upper contour
sets at those allocations unchanged.
Finally, we turn to our third axiom, Free Lunch Aversion. Consider a
proﬁle R a n da na l l o c a t i o na tw h i c ht w oa g e n t s ,i and j,c o n s u m et h es a m e
quantity of the nonrival good. Suppose that i’s private good contribution
is positive but j’s contribution is negative. Since j enjoys a “free lunch”, a
transfer of private good from j to i that does not reverse the signs of their
contributions should be deemed to increase social welfare.
Free Lunch Aversion. Let R ∈ RN, (x,y), (x0,y) ∈ Z(R), and i,j ∈ N.
Suppose that x−ij = x0
−ij,y i = yj, and xi + xj = x0
i + x0
j. Then, {xj <x 0
j ≤
0 ≤ x0
i <x i} ⇒ {(x0,y)P(R)(x,y)}.
This axiom is directly inspired by Moulin’s (1987) No Private Transfers
condition. Moulin’s condition, which applies to allocation rules rather than
social ordering functions, requires that everyone contribute a non-negative
quantity of the private good to ﬁnance the production of the nonrival good.
In our axiom, the proviso that both agents consume the same quantity of the
nonrival good is crucial. Indeed, as exclusion is possible, it may be fair to let
people contribute less than others if they also consume less of the nonrival
good. Even a negative contribution may be sensible, if it is the required
compensation for being partially excluded.
4T h e r e s u l t
We now state and discuss our result. It concerns a form of welfare egalitar-
ianism under which an agent’s welfare is measured in terms of the nonrival
good, that is, by the quantity of nonrival good which, consumed for free,
would make her indiﬀerent to the bundle she receives.
For each Ri ∈ R and zi ∈ Zi(Ri), there is a unique level of the nonrival
good, y0
i ∈ R+, such that ziIi(0,y0
i). We may therefore deﬁne the numerical






The number u(Ri,z i)i sa g e n ti’s nonrival good welfare level at bundle zi.
5A social ordering function R is a nonrival-good-welfare maximin function
if, at any proﬁle, the ordering of allocations it prescribes is consistent with
the application of the maximin criterion to the nonrival good welfare levels










A prominent example is the nonrival-good-welfare leximin function RL.L e t
<L denote the usual leximin ordering of RN
+ : for any w,w0 ∈ RN
+,w< w0 if
and only if the smallest coordinate of w is greater than the smallest coordinate
of w0, or they are equal but the second smallest coordinate of w is greater
than the second smallest coordinate of w0, and so on. The social ordering
function RL ranks the admissible allocations for any given preference proﬁle
by applying the leximin ordering to the corresponding vectors of nonrival
good welfare levels: for any R ∈ RN and z,z0 ∈ Z(R),
zRL(R)z





This social ordering function meets all of the axioms considered in Section
3. Conversely, these axioms force us to use a nonrival-good-welfare maximin
function.
Theorem.
i) The nonrival-good-welfare leximin function RL satisﬁes the Strong
Pareto Principle, Responsiveness, and Free Lunch Aversion.
ii) Every social ordering function R satisfying Unanimous Indiﬀerence,
Responsiveness, and Free Lunch Aversion is a nonrival-good-welfare maximin
function satisfying Unanimity.
A few comments are in order.
1) At the risk of stressing the obvious, we emphasize that the axioms and
the social ordering functions appearing in our theorem are ordinal. The in-
f o r m a t i o nu s e dt od e ﬁne them is entirely contained in the agents’ preferences,
which are simply orderings over consumption bundles: no utility information
is available in our model. Our result is therefore fundamentally diﬀerent from
the various classical characterizations of the maximin and leximin social wel-
fare orderings surveyed, for instance, in d’Aspremont and Gevers (2001). In
that literature, individual utilities are given and social welfare orderings are
constructed over vectors of individual utilities.
6Having stressed that point, it appears that the contribution of (the second
part of) our theorem is really twofold. Not only do our axioms lead us to rank
allocations by applying the maximin criterion to vectors of corresponding
welfare levels, they also force us to use a speciﬁc welfare representation of
preferences, namely, the nonrival-good-welfare representation.
2) (nonrival-good-)welfare maximin functions are radically averse to (non-
rival-good-)welfare inequalities: social welfare may be improved by an arbi-
trarily small increase in the welfare of the worst-oﬀ agent obtained at the
cost of possibly huge welfare losses to the others.
It is interesting and somewhat surprising that our axioms deliver such
an extreme conclusion. Clearly, Free Lunch Aversion expresses a form of
welfare inequality aversion. But it is a very mild one. Indeed, Free Lunch
Aversion implies that reducing the nonrival-good-welfare gap between two
agents improves social welfare only when two very speciﬁc conditions are
met: the agents must consume the same quantity of the nonrival good, and
the welfare gap reduction must be obtained by a mere private good transfer
from one to the other. This should be contrasted with much more radical
axioms of welfare inequality aversion used in characterizations of the classical
leximin social welfare ordering over utility space, such as Hammond’s (1976)
equity axiom.
Unanimous Indiﬀerence and Responsiveness, however, happen to comple-
ment Free Lunch Aversion remarkably. Starting with an allocation where two
agents enjoy diﬀerent nonrival good welfare levels, Unanimous Indiﬀerence al-
lows us, by “sliding along their indiﬀerence curves”, to ﬁnd socially equivalent
allocations where their consumptions of the nonrival good are equal and their
private good contributions have opposite signs. By Free Lunch Aversion, any
welfare inequality reduction resulting from a suﬃciently small private good
transfer from the better-oﬀ to the worse-oﬀ agent improves social welfare. It
turns out that Responsiveness forces us to extend this conclusion to welfare
inequality reductions that involve an arbitrarily small welfare gain against a
large welfare loss, thereby reaching the maximin criterion.
3) The axioms in statement ii) of our theorem are independent.
The function assigning to each preference proﬁle the social ordering ac-
cording to which all allocations are equivalent trivially satisﬁes Unanimous
Indiﬀerence and Responsiveness, but violates Free Lunch Aversion. The
nonrival-good-welfare utilitarian function RU deﬁned by zRU(R) z0 if and
only if
P
i∈N u(Ri,z i) ≥
P
i∈N u(Ri,z0
i) is another example; note that it even
7satisﬁes the Strong Pareto Principle.
The function RV deﬁned by (x,y)RV(R)(x0,y0) if and only if
P
i∈N |xi| ≤ P
i∈N |x0
i| satisﬁes Free Lunch Aversion and Responsiveness, but not Unani-
mous Indiﬀerence.
Finally, consider the following social ordering function RL,U. On those
preference proﬁles where all agents have strictly convex preferences that are
additively separable and linear in the nonrival good, RL,U coincides with
RU. On all other proﬁles, RL,U coincides with RL. This function satisﬁes
Unanimous Indiﬀerence, Free Lunch Aversion (strict convexity guarantees
that the sum of utilities after a “free lunch transfer” be strictly larger than
before the transfer), but not Responsiveness.
4) Our theorem is not quite a complete characterization.
Regarding statement i), RL is not the only social ordering function sat-
isfying the Strong Pareto Principle, Responsiveness, and Free Lunch Aver-
sion. Other examples include functions that agree with RL whenever the
latter does not declare a tie between two allocations, but break such ties
according to an a priori ordering of the agents. For instance, let <l be the
lexicographic ordering of RN
+ corresponding to the natural ordering of the
agents and deﬁne zRL,l(R)z0 if and only if either i) zPL(R)z0 or ii) zIL(R)z0
and (u(R1,z 1),...,u(Rn,z n)) <l (u(R1,z0
1),...,u(Rn,z0
n)). The social ordering
function RL,l satisﬁes the Strong Pareto Principle, Free Lunch Aversion and
Responsiveness.
Regarding statement ii), not all nonrival-good-welfare maximin func-
tions respecting Unanimity satisfy Responsiveness or Free Lunch Aversion.
For instance, the function RM deﬁned by zRM(R)z0 ⇔ mini∈N u(Ri,z i) ≥
mini∈N u(Ri,z0
i) violates Free Lunch Aversion. The reader may easily mod-
ify this example to construct nonrival-good-welfare maximin functions that
satisfy the Strong Pareto Principle but violate both Responsiveness and Free
Lunch Aversion.
5) In addition to the properties stated in our theorem, the nonrival-good-
welfare leximin function satisﬁes many other axioms that may be adapted
from social choice theory to our setting. For instance, it is independent of
the feasible set, in the sense that the ordering of allocations recommended at
any preference proﬁle does not vary with the technology of production of the
nonrival good (see Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2001) for a discussion of such
independence properties). It also possesses properties of separability similar
to those enjoyed by the classical leximin social welfare ordering over utility
8space (see d’Aspremont and Gevers (2001) for a survey).
5P r o o f o f t h e r e s u l t
Unanimity is the conjunction of two conditions which we ﬁnd useful to sep-
arate and name as follows.
Unanimous Preference. Let R ∈ RN and z,z0 ∈ Z(R). If ziRiz0
i for
all i ∈ N,t h e nzR(R)z0.
Unanimous Strict Preference. Let R ∈ RN and z,z0 ∈ Z(R). If
ziPiz0
i for all i ∈ N,t h e nzP(R)z0.
We proceed by proving two lemmata.
Lemma 1. If a social ordering function R satisﬁes Unanimous Indiﬀer-
ence and Responsiveness, then it satisﬁes Unanimous Preference.
Proof. Let R satisfy Unanimous Indiﬀerence and Responsiveness. Sup-
pose that, contrary to the claim, R violates Unanimous Preference. There
must exist a proﬁle R ∈ RN, two allocations z1,z2 ∈ Z(R), and a set of
agents I ⊆ N such that for all i ∈ I, z2
iPiz1
i,f o ra l li ∈ N \ I, z2
iIiz1
i,a n d
z1P(R)z2. For the sake of simplicity, we may assume that there exists i ∈ N
such that I = {i}, the more than one agent case being treated by simply
reproducing the argument |I| times. Because of Responsiveness, we may as-
sume that Bi(Ri,z1
i) is strictly convex, that is, λz1
i +(1−λ)zi Pi z1
i whenever
ziIiz1
i,z i 6= z1
i, and 0 < λ < 1.
As illustrated on Figure 1, choose z3
i =( x3
i,y 3






i.L e tC be the convex hull of {(xi,y i) ∈ B(Ri,z1
i) | yi ≥ y3
i)} ∪
B(Ri,z2
i) and denote by ∂C t h es t r i c ts o u t h - e a s tf r o n t i e ro fC,t h a ti s ,∂C =
{(xi,y i) ∈ C | (x0
i,y0
i)=( xi,y i) for all (x0
i,y 0
i) ∈ C such that x0
i ≥ xi and y0
i ≤
yi}. By construction, there exists z4















Such a construction is possible because Bi(Ri,z1
i)i ss t r i c t l yc o n v e x . S i n c e
z4
i ∈ ∂C, we have z3
iI0
iz4






Lemma 2. If a social ordering function R satisﬁes Unanimous Prefer-
e n c ea n dF r e eL u n c hA v e r s i o n ,t h e ni ts a t i s ﬁes Unanimous Strict Preference.
9Proof. Let R satisfy Unanimous Preference and Free Lunch Aversion.
Suppose now, by way of contradiction, that R violates Unanimous Strict
Preference. Let R ∈ RN and z1,z2 ∈ Z(R) be such that z2
iPiz1





Without loss of generality, assume that u(R1,z1
1) ≥ u(Ri,z1
i)f o ra l li ∈ N.
It follows that u(R1,z2
1) >u (Ri,z1
i) for all i ∈ N. As illustrated on Figure











2. By continuity of R1 and R2, we can ﬁnd ε > 0
small enough to guarantee that x3
1 + ε < 0 <x 3





















Proof of the Theorem. The straightforward proof that RL satisﬁes
the Strong Pareto Principle and Responsiveness is left to the reader. To
check Free Lunch Aversion, let R ∈ RN, (x,y),(x0,y) ∈ Z(R), and i,j ∈ N.
Suppose that x−ij = x0
−ij,y i = yj,x i + xj = x0
i + x0
j, and xj <x 0
j ≤ 0 ≤
x0
i <x i. Because preferences are strictly decreasing in private good con-
tributions, (0,y i)Ri(x0
i,y i)Pi(xi,y i)a n d( xj,y j)Pj(x0
j,y j)Rj(0,y j). Therefore
u(Ri,(xi,y i)) <u (Ri,(x0
i,y i)) ≤ yi = yj ≤ u(Rj,(x0
j,y j)) <u (Rj,(xj,y j))
and, hence, ( u(R1, (x0
1,y 1)), ..., u(Rn, (x0
n,y n))) <L (u(R1,(x1,y 1)), ...,
u(Rn,(xn,y n))), as desired.
Conversely, let R satisfy Unanimous Indiﬀerence, Responsiveness, and
Free Lunch Aversion. By Lemmata 1 and 2, R satisﬁes Unanimity. It remains
to be shown that R is a nonrival-good-welfare maximin function. Suppose,
by way of contradiction, that there exist R ∈ RN and z,z0 ∈ Z(R)s u c ht h a t
min
i∈N








Deﬁne M to be the unique subset of N such that




i) ≤ u(Rj,z j)f o ra l li ∈ M and all j ∈ N \ M, (5)
10and let m denote the cardinality of M. By (3), m>0. We may further
assume that m<nbecause (4) and (5) directly conﬂict with Unanimous
Strict Preference if m = n. We will construct a preference proﬁle R0, two
allocations q,q0 ∈ Z(R0), and a set M0 of cardinality m +1s u c ht h a t
u(R
0








j,q j)f o ra l li ∈ M






Repeating the construction n−m times eventually yields a contradiction to
Unanimous Strict Preference.
The construction is illustrated on Figure 3. Assume, without loss of
generality, that 1 ∈ M and 2 ∈ N\M. Assume, furthermore, that








1) <u (R2,z 2). (8)
This entails no loss of generality: if (8) does not hold, there exist t,t0 ∈ Z(R)
such that u(Ri,z i) ≤ u(Ri,t i)a n du(Ri,z0
i) ≥ u(Ri,t 0
i) for all i ∈ N, and the
conditions obtained from (5) and (8) by replacing z and z0 with t and t0 hold.
By Unanimity and (4), tR(R)zR(R)z0R(R)t0, hence, tR(R)t0, and we need
only replace z and z0 with t and t0 in the argument below.
To alleviate notation, let us write u(Ri,z i)=ui and u(Ri,z0
i)=u0
i for
i =1 ,2. By deﬁnition of u(Ri,.), and Unanimous Indiﬀerence, (4) yields







Our continuity and strict monotonicity assumptions on preferences guar-
antee that for any suﬃciently small ε > 0t h e r ee x i s tx1(ε) > 0a n dx2(ε) < 0
such that
(x1(ε),u 2 − ε) I1 (0,u 1),
(x2(ε),u 2 − ε) I2 (0,u 2),
and x1(ε)+x2(ε) > 0. Let us choose ε > 0 small enough to also guarantee
that u0
2 <u 2 − ε and that the quantity y(ε) such that (0,y(ε)) I1 (x1(ε)+
x2(ε),u 2 − ε) is strictly between u1 and u0
2.
By continuity and strict monotonicity of preferences again, there exist
y0(ε),x 0
1(ε) > 0, and x0











11and u1 <y (ε) <y 0(ε) <u 0
2.
Next, choose ε0 > 0 small enough to ensure that x0
2(ε)+ε0 < 0 <x 0
1(ε)−2ε0
and (0,u 2)P2(x0















2 (0,u 2 − ε),





2,(0,u 2)) ⊆ B(R2,(0,u 2)).




i = Ri for all i ∈ N\2. Using successively Free Lunch Aversion,
Unanimous Indiﬀerence, Free Lunch Aversion again, Unanimous Indiﬀerence





















0)( ( x1(ε)+x2(ε),u 2 − ε),(0,u 2 − ε),z −12)
P(R
0)( ( x1(ε),u 2 − ε), (x2(ε),u 2 − ε)),z −12)
I(R
0) ((0,u 1),(0,u 2),z −12)
R(R







Denote by q and q0 the ﬁrst and last allocations in this chain, and deﬁne
M0 = M ∪{2}. We have qR(R0)q0, which is (7). By construction, u(R0
1,q 1) <
u(R0
2,q 2) <u (R0
2,q 0
2)=m i n i∈N u(R0
i,q0
i)a n do fc o u r s eq−12 = z−12 and q0
−12 =
z0
−12. Therefore (5) implies u(R0
i,q i) < mini∈N u(R0
i,q0
i) ≤ u(R0
j,q j) for all
i ∈ M0 and all j ∈ N\M0, which is just (6).
6 Concluding comments
Our axiomatic analysis has led us to recommend a particular social order-
ing function, the so-called nonrival-good-welfare leximin function. While our
result concerns the deﬁnition of social objectives, it does provide norma-
tive guidelines for actual social choices. Given a preference proﬁle R and
a suitably restricted cost function c, maximizing the social ordering RL(R)
12subject to the technological constraint
P
i∈N xi ≥ c(maxi∈N yi) yields exactly
the egalitarian-equivalent allocations advocated by Moulin (1987).
Incidentally, it is noteworthy that the technological constraint just stated
is the only reason that really forces us to interpret the y good as a nonrival
good. Since this constraint is not part of our formal model, we remain free
to regard the y good as a private good and to reinterpret our axioms and
our theorem in the context of production and cost-sharing of a private good.
In such a context, the recommended choices would result from maximization
subject to the alternative technological constraint
P
i∈N xi ≥ c(
P
i∈N yi). We
focused on the nonrival good interpretation because we ﬁnd the Free Lunch
Aversion axiom particularly appealing in that context.
Finally, our result provides a systematic tool for recommending second-
best choices. Indeed, we may search for allocations that maximize the social
ordering prescribed by the leximin function subject to any list of constraints
that may be relevant, including incentive-compatibility requirements. We
leave the study of such second-best allocation rules for future research.
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